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GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS OF ATTRACTING EXTERNAL EQUITY INVESTORS IN 
PRIVATE FAMILY FIRMS
Abstract
While research commonly assumes business-owning families are concerned about the 
preservation of control, more and more families seek cooperation with external investors to 
accomplish firm- and/or family level-goals. In this paper, we provide a conceptual configuration 
of the different governance scenarios that may arise when family owners attract outside capital. 
Combining two important family objectives - its objective to provide liquidity either to the 
family or to the firm, and its objective to cede or to retain long-term family control - we identify 
four scenarios with different governance implications and preferred types of external investors. 
Our analysis contributes to an increased understanding of the evolving structures of ownership in 
private family firms, the effectiveness and efficiency of governance arrangements in family firm-
external investor cooperations and the increasingly heterogeneous private equity funding 
landscape. 
Keywords: corporate governance, family firms, private equity, alternative investors, 
governance configurations






























































GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS OF ATTRACTING EXTERNAL EQUITY INVESTORS IN 
PRIVATE FAMILY FIRMS
While it is commonly assumed that family firms are reluctant to hand over control to 
outside investors (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Mahérault, 2004; Poutziouris, 
2001; Wu, Chua, & Chrisman, 2007), more and more private family firms open their capital for 
external investors (Battistin, Bortoluzzi, Buttignon, & Vedovato, 2017; Dawson, 2011; Wessel, 
Decker, Lange, & Hack, 2014). This evolution is driven by trends in both the demand and supply 
of capital. Family firms increasingly consider equity investments because more stringent capital 
and liquidity regulations such as Basel III have made longer term bank lending to these firms, 
which are often smaller, less attractive (OECD, 2012). Furthermore, many business owners who 
are reaching retirement age seek investors to diversify their wealth or to accomplish 
transgenerational successions. At the same time, new ‘players’ such as family offices and high 
net worth individuals (HNWIs) increasingly invest in private family firms (Rottke & Thiele, 
2017), in addition to established investors such as private equity (PE) firms1. For example, 
European family offices nearly doubled their direct investments in private companies between 
2008 and 2014 (Campden Research & UBS, 2015).
The role of external investors in private family firms has only received limited attention 
in the academic literature. Some studies examined PE buyouts of family firms (Howorth, 
Westhead, & Wright, 2004; Scholes, Wright, Westhead, & Bruining, 2010) or external 
ownership transitions of family firms more generally (Wennberg, Wiklund, Hellerstedt, & 
1 PE is defined as risk capital provided by professional investors to mature, unquoted private businesses (Invest 
Europe, 2017). PE involves medium to long-term investments (generally three to seven years), characterized by 
active ownership. Investors in PE funds are principally institutional investors, such as insurance companies and 
pension funds.






























































Nordqvist, 2011; Wiklund, Nordqvist, Hellerstedt, & Bird, 2013), whereby the family fully exits 
the firm and control is ceded to new owners. However, few studies examined scenarios where 
families do not cede full control but instead seek cooperation and thereby share control with 
investors to accomplish their goals. Similarly, the PE literature mainly focuses on PE-backed 
buyouts, often of public firms, but much less on investments in private firms, including minority 
investments. Additionally, the important role of alternative investors such as family offices in 
ownership transitions of private family firms has largely been neglected.
The question how investors can contribute to private family firms is not only empirically 
relevant but also theoretically intriguing. Following the management and finance literatures, 
investors and family owners may not be the best partners as they are assumed to hold 
considerably different objectives. Investors such as PE firms invest in a portfolio of firms and 
focus on the maximization of a economic value in the medium term (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009; 
Wood & Wright, 2009). Family owners, in contrast, typically have their wealth concentrated in 
one firm and have long-term objectives that are not always economic in nature (Berrone, Cruz, & 
Gómez-Mejía, 2012; Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012). These different objectives 
might lead to principal-principal conflicts (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). 
Therefore, more insights in ownership transitions and related governance mechanisms in private 
family firms are key to better understand transitions or cooperations between families and equity 
investors (Uhlaner, Wright, & Huse, 2007).
To enrich our understanding of the role of different investor types for private family 
firms, this paper provides a conceptual configuration of the governance scenarios that may arise 
when a family decides to attract external shareholders alongside the family shareholders. We 
propose that two family objectives will strongly govern such transaction: the family’s motivation 






























































to provide liquidity either to the firm or to the family, and the family’s degree of 
transgenerational intent. The first objective distinguishes transactions that increase the equity 
capital of the firm and where family shareholders keep their equity and transactions that involve 
a transfer of some, but not all, shares from the family to an external equity investor. The second 
objective distinguishes between scenarios where a family aims to exit the firm in the foreseeable 
future, and scenarios where a family aims to keep the firm within the family over generations. 
Combining these two objectives, we configure external investments in family firms into four 
scenarios. For each scenario, we provide examples, discuss governance implications for firm 
ownership and the level of fit with different types of investors. Regarding governance 
implications, we discuss the wealth concentration and investment time horizon of the remaining 
family, the family’s focus on socioemotional wealth (SEW), the focus on efficiency and/or 
growth as drivers of firm performance, the use of debt to structure the transaction, family 
involvement in management, and the importance of relational governance. We thereby take a 
configurational perspective, proposing that these governance attributes and the type of investor 
(such as independent PE, government-funded PE or family offices) interact in complementary 
ways as part of unique configurations to facilitate successful ownership transitions (Meyer, Tsui, 
& Hinings, 1993). The notion of configuration is used to theorize what governance mechanisms 
are likely to lead to the fulfilment of desired objectives of family owners on the one hand and 
investors on the other hand.
We make several contributions to the research literature. First, our configurational model 
increases understanding about the evolving structures of ownership in private family firms. 
Ownership in private firms is theoretically intriguing because it is relatively illiquid and owners 
tend to be deeply involved in and identify with their firms. The insights also call for research that 






























































takes new theoretical perspectives to study owner dynamics in private firms. While research in 
this area is largely dominated by agency theory (Battistin et al., 2017; Chrisman, Chua, Steier, 
Wright, & McKee, 2012; Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003), our model calls for better 
integrations with alternative theoretical perspectives. Second, our study contributes to the family 
business literature by examining gradual transitions from a family to a non-family firm. To date, 
scholars have paid substantially more attention to the minority of family firms that transition to 
another generation of family members than the majority of family firms that does not (Wennberg 
et al., 2011), leaving substantial gaps in our understanding of ownership transition in family 
firms (Wiklund et al., 2013). Third, our framework increases understanding about the increasing 
heterogeneity among PE investors and the role of alternative investors such as family offices and 
HNWIs. Despite their practical relevance, these investors only received limited attention in the 
research literature so far (Neckebrouck, Manigart, & Meuleman, 2017; Wessel et al., 2014). 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Family Firm Objectives and Decision-Making
Family firms are characterized by the existence of individuals, related by family ties, who 
exert substantial influence on the company, either via ownership stakes or important 
management positions (König, Kammerlander, & Enders, 2013). Although exact numbers for the 
prevalence of family firms vary, research consistently shows that family firms dominate 
economies around the world (La Porta et al., 1999).
The governance and conduct of family firms has been studied from a variety of 
theoretical perspective including mainstream management theories such as agency theory, 






























































stewardship theory, and the resource-based view.2 Agency theory implies that family firms have 
higher performance because they have lower agency costs related to the separation of ownership 
and control (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Yet, agency theory also asserts that 
family owners are risk-averse because they typically hold concentrated wealth positions (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Morck & Yeung, 2003), misuse their power to expropriate minority 
shareholders (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000), and are prone to nepotism (Chrisman, 
Sharma, Steier, & Chua, 2013), executive entrenchment (Volpin, 2002), and intra-family conflict 
(Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). Stewardship, in contrast, suggests that family 
owners act as farsighted stewards of their business (Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Lester, 2011; 
Neckebrouck, Schulze, & Zellweger, 2018) and care about the long-term wellbeing of all 
stakeholders (Davis, Allen, & Hayes, 2010). The resource-based view maintains that family 
firms possess unique resources, which they leverage to benefit performance (Nordqvist, 2005; 
Sirmon & Hitt, 2003).
Next to these mainstream theories, over the last decade, the socioemotional wealth (SEW) 
perspective developed as a dominant theoretical paradigm in the family business field. Profit 
generation is rarely the exclusive goal for controlling-ownership families. Meeting the 
nonfinancial social and emotional needs also is an inherent goal of family firms. This is referred 
to as the unique family firm phenomena called SEW. SEW encompasses a variety of aspects 
including the employment of family members (Firfiray, Cruz, Neacsu, & Gomez-Mejia, 2017; 
Gómez-Mejía, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011), enjoyment of family influence over the 
business (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007), 
2 Other theoretical perspectives include transaction cost theory (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Verbeke & Kano, 
2012), identity theory (Cannella, Jones, & Withers, 2015; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2011), and 
embeddedness (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003; L. P. Steier, Chua, & Chrisman, 2009).






























































reputational advantages from being associated with the firm (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013), 
and the preservation of benevolent ties among family members (Cruz, Gómez-Mejia, & Becerra, 
2010).
The key assumption of the SEW perspective is that the preservation of SEW represents a 
primary driver of family firm decision making (Gómez-Mejía, Makri, & Kintana, 2010). For 
example, family firms invest less in R&D (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011) and engage less in 
corporate diversification (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010) because such 
decisions entail losses of SEW, for instance because they require the family to attract outside 
managerial talent thereby reducing family control over the enterprise. More recent refinements 
nuance the view that family firms are foremost concerned with SEW goals arguing that family 
owners weigh implications of their decisions on financial wealth and SEW in tandem (Gómez-
Mejía, Patel, & Zellweger, 2018; Kotlar, Signori, De Massis, & Vismara, 2018).
Importantly, family firms are heterogeneous in the extent to which they pursue SEW 
objectives. Conceptually, SEW is inherently linked to the extent of family control over the firm 
and the degree of familial identification with the firm (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Smaller, 
privately held family firms focus more on SEW than larger publicly listed family firms because 
familial identification, influence and personal investment is generally higher in the former 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011). Control of the firm is critical because it is what allows the family to 
pursue its interests through the firm (Carney, 2005). 
Family Firms and Financial Decision-Making 
Early studies on family firm financing have drawn from normative capital structure 
theories such as the pecking order theory or the trade-off theory (King & Santor, 2008; López-
Gracia & Sánchez-Andújar, 2007). When applied to family firms, however, traditional capital 






























































structure theories often lead to inconclusive results because their assumptions about rational 
economic behavior may not apply to family firms in which decision making is frequently 
influenced by non-economic family goals (e.g., Koropp, Grichnik, & Kellermanns, 2013). 
Studies with a background in the strategic management literature suggest that capital 
structures may reflect the diverse personal goals of decision makers (Barton & Gordon, 1987, 
1988). Several studies find that the financial logic in family firms is influenced by personal 
preferences of family decision makers, leading to differences between family firm financing and 
nonfamily firm financing (Gallo, Tàpies, & Cappuyns, 2004; Romano, Tanewski, & Smyrnios, 
2001). Family firms, for instance, are less likely than nonfamily firms to relinquish control to 
outside investors because families not only derive financial but also socioemotional value from 
their firms (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). 
While informative, the analysis of differences between family and nonfamily firm 
financing policies ignores the heterogeneity of financing decisions within the population of 
family firms. More recent research shows that a family firm’s usage of debt is influenced by 
family governance characteristics such as ownership dispersion (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 
2003a), generational stage (Molly, Laveren, & Jorissen, 2012), managerial succession (Amore, 
Minichilli, & Corbetta, 2011), and owner-manager attitudes (Koropp et al., 2013). However, 
these studies have primarily focused on the usage of debt and largely neglected equity as a form 
of financing. This is surprising, as raising equity from non-family members has significant 
implications for control and governance.
Research on the role of PE as equity provider for family firms is in its infancy. PE 
investments are traditionally viewed from an agency perspective with emphasis on obtaining 
efficiency improvements (Renneboog, Simons, & Wright, 2007); although, PE can also be a 






























































vehicle for strategic renewal that fosters upside entrepreneurial growth (Wright, Hoskisson, 
Busenitz, & Dial, 2000). 
Studies on the role of PE in family firms mostly examine buyouts of family firms wherein 
the family sells its full ownership stake to PE (Howorth et al., 2004; Scholes et al., 2010). Some 
studies analyze the selection criteria used by PE when investing in family firms (Dawson, 2011) 
or valuation particularities of family firms (Ahlers, Hack, & Kellermanns, 2014). Other studies 
analyze the process of professionalization of family firms post buyout (Howorth, Wright, 
Westhead, & Allcock, 2016), and the resulting impact of PE buyouts on the performance and 
growth of former family firms (Battistin et al., 2017; Croce & Martí, 2016; Scholes et al., 2010).
Limited attention, however, has been given to scenarios in which private family firms do 
not cede full control to investors but instead seek cooperation with investors to accomplish their 
goals (Neckebrouck, Manigart, & Meuleman, 2016). Investors hereby may acquire a minority 
stake in the family business, while the family remains the majority shareholder. This is in 
contrast with full buyouts, where PE investors typically acquire a controlling majority stake. A 
key question in this scenario is how potentially divergent goals may lead to principal-principal 
conflicts (Martin, Gómez-Mejía, Berrone, & Makri, 2017; Young et al., 2008). Villanueva and 
Sapienza (2009) suggest that the identity of formal, financially oriented investors, such as PE 
firms, is unlikely to fit well with family firms. Because family owners often value the 
preservation of SEW next to the maximization of financial wealth, conflicts between PE 
investors and the family may arise. Such conflicts might be limited when the firms perform well 
but can be especially prevalent when the firm underperforms (Martin et al., 2017).
Even if partnering between private family firms and financial investors involves a risk of 
conflict, recent evidence indicates that more and more private family firms open their capital to 






























































investors (Battistin et al., 2017). A key question, therefore, is what are the governance 
implications of a transition from a fully-owned family business to a multiple ownership structure 
involving outside equity investors (Uhlaner et al., 2007), and what type of investors are most 
likely to provide a good fit? Using a configurational approach to corporate governance (Meyer et 
al., 1993; Miles & Snow, 1978), we propose that ‘bundles’ of governance practices exist that are 
consistent with family preferences, firm needs and types of investors (Misangyi & Acharya, 
2014; Rediker & Seth, 1995). Each configuration is a gestalt of multiple, interlinked, and 
mutually reinforcing organizational and structural characteristics that are complementary with 
each other and commonly occur together (Meyer et al., 1993; Miller, Friesen, & Mintzberg, 
1984). Complementarity implies that governance mechanisms mutually reinforce the 
effectiveness of one another (Schiehll, Lewellyn, & Muller-Kahle, 2017). In the remainder of 
this paper we use the notion of configurations to reflect on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
different governance constellations in collaborations between family firms and investors.
CONFIGURATION MODEL
We now focus on transactions in which a traditional PE investor or an alternative 
investor, such as a family office or HNWI, acquires a shareholding next to the family. Figure 1 
illustrates our configurational framework. The horizontal axis differentiates between transactions 
in which an investor increases a firm’s capital while family owners retain their shareholdings 
(liquidity for the firm) and transactions in which investors replace family equity and, therefore, 
some family members decide to sell all or a proportion of their shares (liquidity for the family). 
The vertical axis differentiates between families who are looking to cede ownership in the 
medium term (ceding family ownership) and families who aim to retain ownership (enduring 
family ownership). The evolution of a firm’s equity structure over time is illustrated for each 






























































quadrant. The entry (t1) and exit (t2) time of the investor are marked. In Quadrant 3 and 4, the 
family remains shareholder after the investor exits at t2; in Quadrant 1 and 2, the family exits at 
t2, often together with the investor.
--- Please insert Figure 1 about here ---
In the subsections that follow, we describe different transaction types related to these four 
quadrants, provide examples, and discuss governance implications. We use the notion of 
configuration to theorize about the ideal constellation of governance characteristics in each 
quadrant. Specifically, for each quadrant, we reflect on the combination of formal and informal 
governance mechanisms that will be most efficient and effective in fulfilling the specific 
economic and/or non-economic objectives of the family and the investor. Following a 
configurational approach, governance mechanisms in such “ideal deals” must show high levels 
of fit with the overarching goals and resources of the family and with each other. 
Most configurational research defines governance performance solely in terms of 
efficiency, typically firm profitability (e.g., Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). In our context, 
however, it is critical to also assess performance in terms of effectiveness. While efficiency 
focuses on the relationship between inputs and outputs, effectiveness in our context relates to the 
extent to which an investment helps a family to achieve its idiosyncratic economic and non-
economic goals. Assessing performance as achievement of goals is particularly important in 
family firms because of the non-economic goals family firms possess (Chua, 2018).
Our framework is shown in Table 1. In terms of governance implications, we include 
different factors highlighted in the literature. From a family perspective, we consider the wealth 
concentration of the remaining family, the family’s investment time horizon and the extent to 
which family owners focus on SEW-objectives. First, the wealth concentration of the remaining 






























































family is important because owning families, due to their relatively undiversified wealth 
position, are generally more risk averse toward growth (La Porta et al., 1999). This risk aversion 
might be a source of conflict with investors who typically have more diversified portfolios and, 
therefore, a higher risk propensity. Second, owners might have differing time horizons 
concerning their involvement in a firm potentially causing conflicts of interest (Arthurs, 
Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Johnson, 2008). For example, traditional independent PE investors 
generally seek an exit after three to five years whereas family owners might have a long-term 
horizon without clear exit intentions. Third, the focus on SEW may direct the family to prioritize 
non-economic objectives over the objective of wealth maximization that is commonly prioritized 
by investors (Zellweger, Nason, Nordqvist, & Brush, 2013). SEW-considerations will influence 
the family’s preference for certain investor types and governance arrangements. 
From a firm perspective, we consider a focus on efficiency and/or growth as a main driver 
of value creation post-investment, the use of debt to structure the transaction and the likelihood 
that the family will reduce its involvement in firm management. First, increasing efficiency has 
been one of the central mechanisms for investors such as traditional PE firms to create value 
(Cumming, Siegel, & Wright, 2007). However, efficiency-enhancing interventions might involve 
restructuring activities such as reducing the workforce or replacing family employees that might 
be detrimental to the family’s reputation or SEW and, therefore, be a source of owner conflict. 
Second, traditional PE investors increasingly focus on growth to generate returns (Hoskisson, 
Shi, Yi, & Jin, 2013; Wright, Hoskisson, & Busenitz, 2001). However, family firms might be 
reluctant to pursue risky growth strategies which could lead to conflicting objectives and, 
therefore, requires appropriate governance. Third, a key element of PE governance is the use of 
debt instruments versus equity (Wright, Amess, Weir, & Girma, 2009). While all transaction 






























































types discussed in Table 1 will generally involve the use of equity instruments, some investors 
might combine traditional equity with debt and debt-like instruments to structure the transaction. 
Debt instruments typically have few rights of control unless the firm becomes insolvent (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). From a family perspective, debt-like instruments have the advantage that 
they require less involvement of investors. However, an excessive use of debt will also increase 
the likelihood of financial distress and endanger the family’s SEW. Fourth, we discuss the 
likelihood that the family will reduce its involvement in firm management as part of the deal, for 
instance by giving up the CEO position. The decision to decrease involvement in management 
may relate to structural family-level considerations (for instance when a family-member CEO is 
reaching retirement age) but may also relate to economic considerations. The willingness to give 
up control over management is important because it may influence the type of investor that can 
be attracted, and the extent to which family owners can derive SEW from their firm following 
the transaction.
Finally, we discuss the type of investor that is most likely to provide a good fit, and how 
important relational governance will be in driving the family-investor relationship. Different 
types of investors clearly have different objectives including investment time horizon, preferred 
risk profile, the pursuit of non-economic goals (such as investor reputation), active involvement 
in portfolio firms, and so forth (Cumming, Schmidt, & Walz, 2010; Drover et al., 2017; 
Hoskisson, Shi, et al., 2013; Manigart & Wright, 2013). Following a configurational approach, 
the performance of outside investments in private family firms will be highest when investor 
objectives are consistent with the family and firm-level governance factors discussed earlier. A 
key question that arises in this respect is what type of governance will drive the investor family 
collaboration. Given the embeddedness of family relationships in family firms, many scholars 






























































depict family firms as a context in which relational governance based on mutual trust, a shared 
vision and identity dominates over contractual governance as stipulated in shareholder 
agreements, incentives and monitoring systems (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007; Chrisman, 
Chua, Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Steier, 2018; Eddleston, Chrisman, Steier, & Chua, 2010; 
Steier, 2001). Compared to nonfamily firms, family firms may be more inclined to establish 
trusting relationships because they are concerned about long-term stability and the preservation 
of a favourable reputation (Eddleston & Morgan, 2014; Stanley & McDowell, 2014). In contrast, 
PE investors traditionally rely on formal shareholder agreements to create alignment on 
economic objectives and to regulate the execution of voting rights or the transfer of shares 
(Chemla, Habib, & Ljungqvist, 2007). Even though contractual governance will be essential in 
all transaction types, contractual governance is ill-suited to address questions that are of 
managerial and non-economic nature (such as a firm’s strategic position, growth aspirations, as 
well as the preservation of the family’s SEW) (Schulze et al., 2001). Overall, relational 
governance may be key for investors and family owners to work together successfully and, 
therefore, is a key element of firm governance.
Quadrant 1: Gradual Exit
Families in Quadrant 1 (Figure 1) seek a gradual exit from their family business. 
Therefore, they may engage in cooperation with an external investor to diversify some of their 
wealth in the short term (time t1), while aiming to simultaneously maximize firm value before a 
final exit (time t2). We define these transactions as gradual exits. Families in this quadrant have 
no transgenerational intent. The equity investment only involves a partial change in ownership 
and does not provide extra capital to the firm.






























































An example of a gradual exit is the buyout of La Buvette, a French agricultural 
equipment manufacturer owned by the fifth generation of the Gustin family, in 2003 (Schmohl, 
2010). The family felt that their firm still had value creation potential, but they needed a partner 
to professionalize further. Because there were no successors in the family and because they were 
concerned about the long-term independence of the firm, the family started negotiations with 
external investors. The family retained Alliance Entreprendre, a local mid-market bank-affiliated 
buyout fund, as an investor given its value adding potential, cultural fit, and attractiveness of the 
financial offer. Following the deal, the family gave up the CEO position and retained a minority 
stake. Alliance Entreprendre monitored the cash flows of the business closely, introduced more 
systematic management processes and prepared the business for a joint exit with the family.
Table 1 summarizes key governance implications of transactions in this quadrant and the 
potential fit with different investor types. From a family perspective, next to family owners who 
sell all their shares in the transaction, remaining family owners may decide to diversify their 
wealth by selling some of their shares. This reduces their wealth concentration in the firm and 
increases the likelihood that the risk profile matches that of investors reducing agency conflicts. 
Additionally, before investing, investors typically verify which family members want to remain 
involved in the firm and which want to quit. Investors will buy out family members who do not 
commit to a joint strategic plan. This will reduce the likelihood of principal-principal conflicts 
between remaining family members (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003b). Second, remaining 
family owners often seek an exit in the medium term when the business has been 
professionalized. While remaining family owners may have concerns about the preservation of 
SEW, family owners who do not have intentions for transgenerational control generally have 
reduced SEW perceptions (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, et al., 2012; Zellweger, Kellermanns, 






























































Chrisman, & Chua, 2012). Reduced expectations about future SEW increase the disposition of 
family owners toward the maximisation of financial wealth (Kotlar et al., 2018). The 
maximization of firm value becomes the dominant goal and should lead to a climate in which 
investors and family owners find a common ground (Villanueva & Sapienza, 2009). Family 
owners also become more likely to prioritize economic considerations in their selection of an 
investor. They may, for instance, prefer an investor who has great value adding skills or a strong 
reputation, but who does not have a strong familial identity (Cannella, Jones, & Withers, 2015).
--- Please insert Table 1 about here ---
From a firm perspective, because these investments do not bring new money in the firm, 
value will mostly be created by focusing on efficiency gains rather than on growth. Opportunities 
to increase efficiency are likely present because private family firms frequently base decision-
making on non-economic personal motives (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Gómez-Mejía, Nuñez-
Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001) and are vulnerable to poor leadership (Schulze et al., 2001). Investors 
can help family owners professionalize the governance and financial management of the firm, 
optimize the business model, cut costs and prepare the business for sale by streamlining 
organizational processes. We anticipate that families may go a long way in supporting such 
governance and operational engineering. Nevertheless, when investors do not acquire dominant 
control over the firm, they might still need to make compromises. Compromises, for instance, 
may be needed when an investor would want to divest a historically important business division 
or dismiss underperforming employees who have close emotional ties with the family. Debt 
financing can be used in these transactions as efficiency improvements should free up cash that 
can be used to pay off debt and boost returns for the remaining shareholders. Debt provides 
incentives to implement efficiency-enhancing initiatives (Jensen, 1989).






























































Because family owners have a lower focus on SEW, reducing family involvement in 
management by attracting an external CEO is a viable option in this scenario. Whether or not the 
family brings in an external CEO will depend on the balance of SEW and economic objectives 
they wish to pursue after the investment. On one hand, attracting an external CEO implies 
accepting a greater loss in SEW (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, et al., 2012). On the other hand, 
external CEOs will bring external experience and may be more willing to make changes in the 
firm. Also, family owners who hire an external CEO send a strong signal toward investors that 
they will direct resources toward financial performance rather than toward the preservation of 
SEW (Jaskiewicz, Combs, Shanine, & Kacmar, 2017; Naldi, Cennamo, Corbetta, & Gomez-
Mejia, 2013). Accordingly, the appointment of an external CEO may further reduce principal-
principal problems and allow the family to attract a high-quality investor (Bertrand & Schoar, 
2006). 
Overall, deals in Quadrant 1 fit relatively well with the traditional PE-model including 
independent PE firms and bank-affiliated PE firms. In the traditional model, PE firms are value-
enhancing because they increase the managerial focus on the realization of efficiency gains 
(Jensen, 1993), and bring financial engineering skills which lead to increased leverage (Kaplan, 
1989). Independent PE firms have a medium-term investment horizon of three to five years 
(Wright et al., 2009) which should provide sufficient time to professionalize the firm and 
implement efficiency-enhancing initiatives. Bank-affiliated PE firms might have an advantage to 
conduct these type of transactions as they could have obtained private information about their 
clients through previous banking relationships and may provide them an opportunity to extend 
more leverage. An important benefit a PE firm could bring to remaining family owners is to 
provide “cover” for efficiency enhancing actions which might break longstanding implicit 






























































contracts with, for example, incompetent employees or suppliers (Villalonga, 2012). By 
monitoring the underlying target and implementing sound corporate governance practices, PE 
firms will help family firms to transition and ultimately facilitate a successful exit (Di Toma & 
Montanari, 2012). We anticipate that transactions in this quadrant will be mainly managed with 
contractual governance and that relational governance will be relatively less important. Because 
of the family owners’ objective to maximize firm economic value and the relatively low focus on 
SEW, most value the family and the investor will expect to generate from the cooperation will be 
of a contractable nature.
Quadrant 2: Extend the firm
In Quadrant 2, families seek a cooperation with an investor to provide capital to the firm 
(time t1) allowing to jointly maximize firm value before an exit in the medium term (time t2). At 
time t2, the family and the investor may jointly exit the firm, the investor can take over the 
family’s stake, or the family may simply sell its stake to another third party. We define these 
transactions as extend the firm deals. Families are looking to prepare their firm for sale but 
realize that more resources can help to fully develop their firm. While deals are somewhat like 
deals in Quadrant 1 because family members plan a medium-term exit, family members retain 
their shareholding and the investment provides extra capital to firm.
An example of a transaction in this quadrant is the investment of the Business Growth 
Fund (BGF) in Molecular Products Group, a UK-based manufacturer of advanced chemistry-
based products, in 2014 (Private Equity Wire, 2017). At that time, the second-generation family 
firm had just started to internationalize. BGF helped the family to realize the firm’s growth 
potential by providing additional capital, strengthening the management team and appointing a 
chairman with relevant experience in acquisitions and major growth initiatives. After the 






























































operating profits had almost doubled, the family and the investor successfully exited the business 
with a sale to another PE player in 2017.
Table 1 lists key governance implications. From a family governance perspective, 
because all family members retain their shareholding, the wealth concentration of family owners 
remains constant. As such, the family and the investor will differ more in their willingness to 
take risk than in Quadrant 1. However, like in Quadrant 1, family owners should have somewhat 
reduced concerns about SEW preservation and will therefore be aligned with investors in their 
objective to maximize firm value in the medium term. From a firm perspective, because 
investments in this quadrant bring new money in the firm, investors can create value by focusing 
on growth next to the realization of efficiency gains and professionalization. To support growth, 
investors can provide family owners with industry expertise, international relationships, expertise 
regarding mergers and acquisitions, and so forth (Meuleman, Amess, Wright, & Scholes, 2009). 
We anticipate that conflicts between family shareholders and investors will be relatively rare 
because a focus on growth (rather than efficiency gains) will require fewer changes in existing 
operations. Nevertheless, investors may need to make compromises when growth-related 
initiatives involve significant risks. Family owners will generally have higher levels of wealth 
concentration and therefore a lower risk tolerance. The use of significant debt financing is less 
likely as the financial obligations associated with debt limit the flexibility needed to pursue 
growth. Compared to Quadrant 1, families may be somewhat more likely to appoint an external 
CEO. Because the investor provides extra capital to the firm, value creation will depend on the 
achievement of profitable growth. Rather than continuing the business ‘as usual’ and building on 
the traditional mechanisms, such as financial engineering, to improve performance, value 
creation should depend more on strategic revitalization (Berg & Gottschalg, 2005). Family 






























































owners may look for a new CEO with an entrepreneurial orientation and an attitude toward 
innovation if the existing family-member CEO does not have the required skill set (Wright et al., 
2000).
Overall, deals in this quadrant fit relatively well with the traditional PE-model including 
independent PE firms and evergreen PE firms. Evergreen PE firms involve funds in which 
realized investment returns are recycled back into the fund rather than distributed to limited 
partners and, therefore, the capital committed is permanent. The key benefit of such structure is 
that it allows for more long-term holding periods compared to traditional PE (Brown & Kraeussl, 
2012). As such, evergreen PE may be especially relevant for families whose exit horizon extends 
beyond the 3 to 5 years horizon of traditional PE. A longer investment horizon will help to reap 
the full benefits of the growth scenario, which typically takes longer to achieve compared with 
efficiency gains as in Quadrant 1. Like in Quadrant 1, family owners and investors will largely 
align with each other using contractual governance. Relational governance including trust may 
be somewhat more important, however, because ownership and shareholder agreements are ill-
suited to ensure alignment on growth-related objectives.
Quadrant 3: Replacement Capital
Families in Quadrant 3 want to cash (some of) their investment, but also have 
transgenerational intents. Family owners for instance may seek investors to solve 
intergenerational transfers with several siblings or other family members. Parents often want to 
treat their children (or cousins) equally when passing on their firm. But when some family 
members want to become or remain owner and others do not, investors may help to overcome 
stalemates by buying the shares of the latter. In this scenario, the succeeding generation has a 
long-time horizon that likely extends beyond the time horizon of the investor (time t2). 






























































An example that illustrates this scenario was the buyout of Market Basket, a New 
England-based supermarket chain owned by the Demoulas family, in 2014. The deal settled a 
life-long conflict between two family cousins that almost led to the demise of the company. In 
the deal, one branch of the Demoulas family acquired the 50.5% stake they did not already own 
from the other branch with funding from the Blackstone Group and significant amounts of debt 
(Forbes, 2014).
From a family governance perspective, the wealth concentration of the remaining family 
will either stay constant or increase. It may increase if the remaining family invests some of its 
personal wealth to acquire a stake of the selling party. A higher level of wealth concentration 
might limit the willingness to take risk. Additionally, because family owners may seek to regain 
full control over their firm in the long-term, they are likely to hold positive expectations about 
future SEW. Such positive expectations increase the disposition of family owners toward the 
minimization of SEW losses when considering an investor and related governance arrangements 
(Kotlar et al., 2018). Family owners will prefer an investor who increases the probability for the 
family to recover SEW in the long-term (Kotlar et al., 2018). 
Because there is no extra capital in the firm, investors need to focus on the realization of 
efficiency gains to create value. However, because cost reductions often require changing old 
habits and the family may be more focused on continuity (Allio, 2004), the potential to realize 
such cost efficiencies may be limited. Given the limited value creation potential, investors will 
often limit their risk by using a financial structure that emphasizes debt over equity and that 
guarantees a minimum required return (e.g., mezzanine financing). As family owners will seek to 
minimize SEW losses when ceding partial ownership, they will be unlikely to appoint an 
external CEO as part of the transaction. 






























































Overall, deals in this quadrant do not fit well with the traditional independent PE-model 
with a closed-end fund. Traditional PE investors and remaining family owners will differ in their 
concern about SEW, in investment time horizon and risk-willingness. Families will likely prefer 
investors with a longer time horizon who allow the remaining family to remain in the driving 
seat and regain control. As highlighted, mezzanine investors may be a good fit, as they will 
typically not take an active position on the board and will employ financial covenants that tend to 
be less strict compared to banks (Torpey & Viscione, 1987)3. Initial owners frequently buy out 
mezzanine investors through the accumulated profits generated by the business or a 
recapitalisation with inexpensive senior debt. Alternatively, bank-affiliated PE funds or 
government-funded funds might also be well positioned to invest in this quadrant. Bank-
affiliated PE investors might provide funding alongside traditional senior loans provided by the 
affiliated banks. As bank-related PE investors have lower return expectations than independent 
PE investors (Manigart et al., 2002), they will also be more willing to provide a debt-like 
structure. Government-funded PE might sponsor these types of transactions to anchor companies 
in the local economy and to preserve regional employment. 
Lastly, in recent years family offices and private investors with a family firm background 
increasingly seek direct investments in private family firms (Rottke & Thiele, 2017). These 
investors might fit well with transactions in this quadrant as they possess values and identities 
consistent with those of a family firm. Family offices, just like family firms, are affected by 
family influence. While the main objective of a family office is to preserve the family’s wealth 
and maintain its legacy, many family offices also place priority on objectives such as family 
harmony, cohesion and general continuity (Rivo-López, Villanueva-Villar, Vaquero-García, & 
3 To protect their interests, mezzanine investors will typically restrict the family’s latitude to execute capital 
reductions, alter dividend-policies, increase CEO compensation or attract more debt (Thompson & Cusmano, 2013).






























































Lago-Peñas, 2017). As such, they take a long-term view on investment and understand the 
importance of the continuation of family legacy and values. Furthermore, family offices that are 
not professionalized may have less formal control mechanisms (Wessel et al., 2014). This will 
resonate well with family owners who are concerned about the preservation of family influence 
over the firm as a source of SEW (Rottke & Thiele, 2017). Overall, family offices might be the 
preferred choice for family firms seeking replacement capital as they have a more consistent 
business philosophy and similar understanding of the needs of the family business (Brueckner, 
2014).
The importance of relational governance in the family-investor relationship will vary 
dependent on the type of investor. For mezzanine investors, who face lower risks than equity 
investors, contractual agreements rather than relational governance will guide relationships. 
Alternatively, for pure equity investors, relational governance with a focus on trust will play a 
key role (Rottke & Thiele, 2017). Given the family owners’ focus on transgenerational 
succession and preservation of SEW, a large part of the value the family will expect to generate 
from the cooperation will be of a non-contractible nature. The long-term horizon of family 
owners and their concern about the protection of family reputation provide increased incentives 
and ability to establish long-term trusting relationships (Arregle et al., 2007; Eddleston & 
Morgan, 2014).
Quadrant 4: Strategic Investment / Turn-Around
In Quadrant 4, families are looking to strengthen the firm’s capital and have a long-term 
investment time horizon. We distinguish between two scenarios. In one scenario, families seek a 
strategic partner to realize growth ambitions. We define these deals as strategic investments. In a 






























































second scenario, families may seek an investor to strengthen the firm’s financial structure in a 
distress situation. We define these deals as turnarounds.
Strategic investments. In this scenario, families collaborate with an external investor to 
raise capital for the firm (time t1 in Figure 1) and have no immediate intention to exit. 
Transactions in this scenario take place when the firm perceives strategic investment 
opportunities that go beyond its immediate financing capacity. At the same time, the family has 
no wish to exit the firm, so typically the family will seek to buy out the outside investor when the 
growth has been realized.
A recent deal illustrating this scenario is the investment of LNK Partners (a New-York 
based PE firm) in Dogfish Head (a family owned and managed craft brewery in Delaware) in 
2015 (Whipp & Daneshkhu, 2016). Dogfish Head needed money and expertise to continue 
growing in an increasingly competitive market. Initially, however, the family owners were very 
sceptic about giving up control. The deal crystallized only after LNK agreed they would treasure 
DogFish Head’s culture, the company would pursue “smart growth over fast growth,” and the 
deal would not be a path to taking the company public. LNK acquired a 15 percent stake and got 
one seat on Dogfish Head’s four-member board of directors.
From a family governance perspective, deals in this quadrant do not alter the family’s 
level of wealth concentration. Furthermore, while investors and family owners will be aligned on 
the objective to pursue growth, conflicts may still occur because investors will generally be less 
concerned about SEW, be more willing to take risks, and have shorter time horizons. Because 
families are concerned about the retention of long-term family control, deals will typically 
involve minority investments.






























































From a firm perspective, investors will focus on the realization of the firm’s growth 
potential. The use of significant debt financing is less likely as the financial obligations 
associated with debt will limit the flexibility needed to pursue growth. Like in Quadrant 3, 
family owners will be unlikely to appoint a new external CEO. Family owners are in a strong 
position to negotiate and will prioritize the preservation of SEW including the continuation of 
family control over decision-making.
Deals in this quadrant only have limited fit with the traditional PE-model because 
families will generally prefer an investor with a long-term horizon. However, over the past years, 
some PE-firms have set up dedicated long-term funds for 20 years that can invest in companies 
for up to ten years. PE firms are rethinking old structures, giving themselves more time, and 
targeting returns of 10 to 12 per cent that are well below the 20 per cent returns usually aimed for 
by ten-year funds (The Economist, 2016). Some of these long-term oriented funds might be well 
suited for this type of transaction. Evergreen funds may also prove to be a good partner. 
Alternatively, if SEW-objectives are particularly pertinent, family offices and private investors 
with a family business background could provide a good fit. We anticipate that relational 
governance will be important in these transactions that involve long-term partnerships. The 
monetary incentives that come from equity ownership will not guarantee the alignment of family 
owners and investor on growth and SEW-related objectives.
Turnaround. Lastly, business-owning families may seek an equity investment because 
their firm is facing financial difficulties. Given the unpredictable outcome and the time and effort 
that might be needed to rescue the company, an exit will not be foreseen in the short term.
An example of a turnaround is the investment of Gimv (a quoted evergreen European PE 
firm) in Vandemoortele (a Belgian producer of bakery products) in 2009. The investment 






























































strengthened the balance sheet of Vandemoortele, which had suffered from a failed acquisition 
and lower revenues after the financial crisis. Supported by the investment, which involved 
subordinated debt with warrants, and after the divestment of an important business division, the 
fourth generation of the Vandemoortele family turned the tide. After seven successful years of 
growth and increased profitability, Gimv executed its warrants and sold its share to the 
Vandemoortele family who had pre-emption rights.
In turnarounds, the wealth concentration of family owners will remain constant or 
increase if they invest some of their private wealth along with the investor. Following the tenets 
of the behavioral agency model (Wiseman & Gómez-Mejía, 1998), the likelihood of conflicts 
between outside investors and family shareholders may depend on the performance evolution of 
the firm. When the firm is in distress, investors and family owners will be aligned on a common 
objective, i.e. to increase the firm’s profitability. Indeed, as the economic risks facing a family 
firm increase, the likelihood that economic considerations precede SEW considerations increases 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).4 Nevertheless, family owners and investors may still disagree about 
strategic alternatives, e.g. when considering laying off employees (Neckebrouck et al., 2016; 
Sraer & Thesmar, 2007) or selling a division. Furthermore, conflicts between investors and the 
family will become more likely when firm performance increases. Relieved from financial 
distress, families may want to regain control over their firm and, if investors do not hold 
sufficient control rights, the latter will become vulnerable to expropriation. Concerning CEO 
replacement, attracting a new external CEO is a likely option and might be a condition imposed 
by the investor. Family owners are in a weak position and are forced to accept losses in SEW to 
4 Financial peril ultimately threatens the survival of the firm, which is the source of both the family’s financial 
wealth and SEW (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía, Patel, & Zellweger, 2018).






























































guarantee firm survival. When selecting a new CEO, skills and experience with turnarounds will 
be most important.
PE investors specialized in distress will provide a good fit with this type of transactions. 
Their focus on efficiency improvements and cost-cutting initiatives, combined with experience in 
divestments, can help to solve financial distress (Hotchkiss, Strömberg, & Smith, 2014). For 
family offices with a focus on the preservation of family wealth turnaround transactions might 
pose too much risk (Rottke & Thiele, 2017). Relative to shareholder agreements and the 
monetary incentives that stem from ownership, relational governance mechanisms will only have 
a subordinate role. Given the focus on firm survival, most value of the cooperation will be of an 
economic nature.
CONFIGURATIONS AS IDEAL TYPES
While we focused our analysis on four distinct configurations, in practice, hybrid forms 
of transactions that cross the boundaries of individual quadrants may occur. Family owners, for 
instance, may seek external equity to provide liquidity for both the firm and the family. 
Following the foundations of configurational theory (Miles & Snow, 1978), a real transaction 
does not need to be classified into one single quadrant however. Configurations should be 
interpreted as ideal-type organizations rather than as nominal categories. The ideal-type 
organization is an important theory-building device that can serve as "an abstract model so that 
deviation from the type can be noted and explained" (Blalock, 1969, p. 32). In our context, the 
degree of deviation between a real transaction and each ideal-type configuration can be used to 
predict governance performance. The performance of a particular configuration should decrease 
the more that configuration deviates from the ideal types (Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985).






























































Most configurational research in governance examines how different governance 
constellations lead to the same overarching objective of maximizing financial performance (e.g., 
Bell, Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2014). In such an approach, configurations are often derived 
empirically and scholars spend a lot of effort on inductively reasoning about the origin of the 
boundaries between the configurations. Our approach in contrast creates configurations that are 
more detached from each other. Each configuration originates from different, rather than one 
common, performance objectives: aiming for the continuation of family control rather than a 
family exit and providing liquidity for the family or for the firm. This implies that deals that 
overlap with multiple quadrants involve transactions in which the family has mixed objectives. 
For instance, family owners may wish to buy out other family members (as in Quadrant 3), 
whilst at the same time also increasing the firm’s capital (as in Quadrant 4). In such a scenario, 
high-performing governance constellations will need to combine characteristics of different 
scenarios: an ideal investor should not only have high value-adding skills that support the 
realisation of profitable growth (as in Quadrant 4) but also allow the family to regain firm control 
over time (as in Quadrant 3).
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
To study the investment cycle involving private family firms and external equity 
investors, including the selection of investors, screening, deal structuring, deal management, and 
deal performance, a wide variety of theoretical perspectives seem relevant. Given the 
heterogeneity in family-level objectives and resources, these investments are best understood by 
applying a multi-theoretic approach. Agency theory, stewardship theory and SEW perspectives 
may be complemented with multiple agency, resource dependence, strategic entrepreneurship, 
social identity, and trust-based perspectives. The configurational approach represents an ideal 






























































opportunity to bring to bear these perspectives while paying attention to organizational variations 
and the rich characterization of types and processes (Chrisman et al., 2018). Our configurational 
analysis shows how the relevance of individual governance perspectives varies across the 
different configurations. Below, we briefly discuss agency theory, multiple agency theory, 
resource dependence, strategic entrepreneurship, stewardship, social identity, SEW, and trust-
based perspectives. Table 2 depicts the most relevant theoretical perspectives for each quadrant.
First, traditional agency theory will be relevant for different types of transactions as it 
focuses on the role of agency costs in family-owned firms and how investors implement 
governance structures to reduce those costs (Uhlaner et al., 2007). In most academic research on 
value creation in PE deals, researchers have focused on agency-based explanations arguing that 
PE firms increase efficiency by limiting managerial discretion (Jensen, 1989). While this view 
may be less relevant to private firms in which owners have strong incentives and ability to 
monitor management (Chung, 2011), the pursuit of SEW-objectives and associated inefficiencies 
likely increase the potential for efficiency gains in private family firms (Chrisman, Chua, Steier, 
et al., 2012). We anticipate that external investors will be able to focus most on the realization of 
efficiency gains in gradual exits in Quadrant 1.
Next to traditional agency theory, we lack applications of multiple agency theory 
including principal-principal agency theory. Multiple agency theory moves beyond a simplistic 
principal-agent dichotomy and considers multiple governance roles as agents and principals of 
the same participants in a transaction (Allcock & Filatotchev, 2010; Arthurs et al., 2008; 
Deutsch, Keil, & Laamanen, 2011). This may cause ambiguity in terms of whose interests are 
served (Hoskisson, Arthurs, White, & Wyatt, 2013; Peng & Sauerwald, 2013). For example, 
principal-principal conflicts might be prevalent when investors take a minority position in a 






























































family firm, which will be common in Quadrant 4a (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Additionally, in 
family firms involving outside investments, family members may play multiple roles as owner 
(principal), manager (agent), and potentially governor of the overall family wealth (agent and 
principal) which will lead to potentially conflicting incentives. Overall, more research is needed 
to examine the extent, heterogeneity and impact of principal-principal relationships in family 
firms involving outside investors.  For example, what is the impact of the type of investor on the 
extent of principal-principal conflict and how will certain governance arrangements (e.g. CEO 
incentives) moderate this relationship.
While agency theory focuses on the efficiency of governance arrangements, resource- 
dependence theory assumes that power dependencies will take precedence in establishing 
governance arrangements (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). From this perspective, investors in 
turnaround deals will have significant power in establishing government arrangements because 
firm survival depends on their provision of financial capital. Alternatively, when family owners 
are in a stronger position to negotiate, they will consider the resource dependencies investors 
impose on the family business when selecting a preferred investor. Families who prioritize the 
retention of long-term family control (as in Quadrant 3) might pick investors who exercise the 
least power, irrespective of the value creation potential. In this scenario, independent PE firms 
will probably be less preferred as potential partners given their typical use of formal control 
mechanisms including specific contracts and board representation.
A strategic entrepreneurship perspective recognizes that access to resources and 
capabilities are important drivers for family firms success (Ireland, Hitt, & Sirmon, 2003). From 
this perspective, investors will help to address the dual challenges of sustaining current 
competitive advantage while pursuing new opportunities to contribute to the longevity of the 






























































family firm. Investors may provide complementary resources and capabilities that may be 
missing in the family business (Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). A key question is how investors 
impact the unique resource and resource-orchestration advantages of private family firms 
(Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, & Gilbert, 2011). Overall, we anticipate 
that strategic entrepreneurship will be most relevant for Quadrants 2 and 4, i.e. deals with growth 
perspectives.
In contrast to agency theory, which assumes owners and managers are motivated by self-
interest, stewardship theory describes owners and managers as stewards who act in trustworthy, 
collectivistic and pro-organizational ways (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Stewardship 
theory has been frequently applied to family firms (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Le Breton-Miller 
et al., 2011). Stewardship theory implies that the family agenda includes the satisfaction of the 
goals of investors as a source of personal satisfaction (Davis et al., 1997). An intriguing question 
is how stewardship behavior may arise in the relationship between family owners and investors. 
Villanueva and Sapienza (2009) anticipate that stewardship behavior is more likely to arise when 
both family owners and investors have a broad agenda including both economic and non-
economic objectives. In that case, principles of reciprocity may govern the relationship and 
family owners and investors may tolerate each other’s non-economic goals for common benefit 
(Villanueva & Sapienza, 2009). These ideas suggest the need to examine how deal-making 
between family owners and investors may support the mediation of competing objectives.5 
Overall, stewardship theory may be most relevant for deals that build on relational governance 
and that involve long-term partnerships such as strategic investments (Quadrant 4a).
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.






























































Research recently applied social identity theory and organizational identification 
concepts to family firm decision-making (Cannella et al., 2015; Zellweger et al., 2013). Due to 
the role of the family business for the family’s biography and the difficulty of the family to leave 
the firm, family members typically maintain a deep identification with their organizations (Dyer, 
2006). Organizational identification may provide a relevant framework to examine the 
investment cycle involving family firms and outside investors. Family owners who strongly 
identify with their firm prefer family offices or private investors with a family business 
background as investors rather than PE sponsors because the former are less likely to disrupt the 
identity of the family (Neckebrouck et al., 2017). Social identity theory might be most relevant 
when families derive high levels of SEW from their identification with the firm as in Quadrants 3 
and 4a.
The SEW perspective gained great traction amongst family business scholars in the last 
decade with recent studies providing deep insights to how family firms balance economic and 
SEW objectives in their decision making (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2018; Kotlar et al., 2018). While 
family firm research traditionally assumes that ceding control involves strong losses in SEW 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), an intriguing question is whether replacement-capital deals that 
enable transgenerational successions (Quadrant 3) may actually increase SEW expectations 
(Kotlar et al., 2018). Overall, while SEW considerations may be prevalent across all quadrants, 
we anticipate they will be particularly influential when families have transgenerational intentions 
as in Quadrants 3 and 4 (Zellweger et al., 2012). We especially encourage research which 
disentangles the role of the different dimensions of SEW (Berrone et al., 2012) and which 
examines the relationship between specific family structures and SEW (Jaskiewicz et al., 2017).






























































Lastly, we agree with Eddleston et al. (2010) and others (Arregle et al., 2007; Cruz et al., 
2010) about the value of trust as a promising theoretical construct to advance understanding of 
family business governance. Trust represents the confidence that another party will refrain from 
exploiting the other’s vulnerabilities even though the other has no control over it (Mayer, Davis, 
& Schoorman, 1995). Cruz et al. (2010) argue that trust provides “a middle ground where agency 
theory and others-oriented theories can meet. Trust scholars do not assume that selfish 
opportunistic behavior is an always present danger, as conventional agency theory suggests, but 
“neither do they assume that opportunism is negligible, as stewardship theory proponents and 
other scholars suggest” (Cruz et al., 2010, p. 71). While research examined the unique value of 
trust within family firms (Steier, 2001), few studies focus on the role of trust in relationships of 
family firms with external stakeholders such as investors (Eddleston & Morgan, 2014). Some 
studies imply that family firms have an advantage in establishing trusting relationships because 
they have higher standards of maintaining a favourable reputation (Craig, Dibrell, & Davis, 
2008). An intriguing question is whether and how trust-based governance mechanisms may 
interact with contractual governance mechanisms in family owner-investor relationships (Poppo 
& Zenger, 2002). Overall, trust-based perspectives may be particularly relevant in deals 
characterized by long-term horizons and non-economic goals, such as in Quadrant 3 and 4a.
CONCLUSION
Scholars examining the role of external investors for family firms mostly examine PE 
buyouts of family firms but pay limited attention to scenarios in which private family firms 
cooperate with investors to accomplish their goals. Recognizing the diversity in objectives that 
may lead family firms to cede ownership to external investors, we developed a conceptual 
configuration model of four governance scenarios that may arise when family owners attract an 






























































external investor. Doing so, our model improves understanding about the evolving structures of 
ownership of private family firms, the increasingly heterogeneous PE funding landscape, and the 
role of alternative investors such as family offices. Our model also supports calls to take a more 
holistic configurational approach to research on family firm governance (Chrisman et al., 2018). 
To understand the consequences of external equity investments in private family firms, scholars 
may need to integrate multiple theoretical perspectives and direct attention to how various 
governance mechanisms combine effectively with each other, rather than merely considering 
governance mechanisms in isolation. We hope our insights stimulate future research on how 
external investors can contribute to private family firms, which constitute the world’s most 
dominant form of organization.
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Governance implications and investor type 
Quadrant 1 Quadrant 2 Quadrant 3 Quadrant 4a Quadrant 4b
Gradual 











Constant Constant or 
increase
Constant Constant or 
increase
Investment time horizon Medium 
term
Medium term Long term Long term Medium term
Family’s focus on socioemotional 
wealth 
Low Low High Medium Low
Firm perspective
Focus on efficiency High Medium Low Low High
Focus on growth Low High Low High Low
Use of debt Medium Low High Low Low
Reduced family involvement in 
management
Possibly Possibly Unlikely Unlikely Likely
Focus on relational governance Low Low Medium High Low



















Most relevant theoretical perspectives































































































Figure 1. Configurational Model for External Equity Investments in Family Firms
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